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Recent empirical evidence highlights that access to 
basic financial services can make a substantial positive 
difference in improving poor people’s lives. Accordingly, 
financial sector reforms that promote financial inclusion 
are increasingly at the core of policymakers’ agendas. The 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor and the World 
Bank Group, in response, launched the Financial Access 
project, including a cross-country database on financial 
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inclusion topics and an annual report to inform the 
policy debate. Using this database, this paper (i) counts 
the number of unbanked adults around the world at 56 
percent, (ii) analyzes the state of access to deposit and 
loan services as well as the extent of retail networks, and 
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1  Introduction 
The strong relationship between financial development and economic growth is well documented 
in the literature (see, for example, King and Levine, 1993; Beck et al., 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998; Beck et al., 2004; Levine, 2005; Klapper et al., 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2008). In more recent years the debate expanded to include the notion of financial “exclusion” as 
a barrier to economic development and the need to build inclusive financial systems (Beck et al., 
2008). 
  
Recent empirical evidence using household data indicates that access to basic financial services 
such as savings, payments and credit can make a substantial positive difference in improving 
poor people’s lives (Caskey et al., 2006; Dupas and Robinson 2009). For firms, especially small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), access to finance is often the main obstacle to growth (Schiffer 
and Weder, 2001; Cressy, 2002; IADB, 2004; and Beck et al., 2005, 2006, and 2008).  
 
Accordingly, financial sector reforms that promote financial inclusion are increasingly at the 
core of the international development agenda for policy makers and development institutions at 
the global level. The United Nations (UN) has declared 2005 the Year of Microfinance, and the 
recent Pittsburg and Korea G-20 communiqués increasingly underscore the importance that this 
topic has gained in the international arena. The Nobel Institute awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to 
the founders of microfinance, Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, in 2006. New 
international bodies, such as the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) have emerged whose 
primary objective is to advance financial inclusion for the world’s poor. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) also increasingly pay 
attention to this debate. The IMF has launched a new database on financial inclusion,
1 and the 
IFC together with Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and AFI have been leading the 
G-20 discussion around financial inclusion for households and SMEs. The Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation has just pledged $500 million per year over the next five years to expand access to 
saving services. 
 
Against this backdrop, the World Bank Group (WBG) has initiated the Financial Access 
indicators and reports to respond to a higher demand for data and measurement of financial 
inclusion. This initiative aims to fill the gap in the data landscape by collecting supply-side data 
on financial access as well as data on financial inclusion policies and regulations from financial 
regulators around the world. The pilot round of surveys was implemented and published as 
Banking the Poor in 2008, which was based on data from both regulator and bank surveys, 
covering 54 countries around the world with a strong focus on Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Subsequently, CGAP and the WBG launched Financial Access 2009, the first in an annual series 




Access 2009 introduced statistics on the use of financial services in 139 countries and mapped a 
broad range of policies and initiatives supporting financial inclusion, focusing on data collection 
and measurement challenges. Building on this, Financial Access 2010 updated statistics on the 
use of financial services and analyzed changes that took place in 2009 – a turbulent year for the 
financial sector in most countries around the world. As more countries provided more and higher 
quality data after the 2009 report, the focus shifted to the analysis of financial inclusion policies 
around the world (see World Bank, 2008; CGAP and the World Bank, 2009 and 2010). 
 
This paper uses the Financial Access database to count the number of unbanked individuals in 
the world, and analyze the change of access to formal financial services around the world.  Next, 
it reviews the role of the main financial regulator in relation to the implementation of financial 
inclusion reforms and mandates to give a broad global picture of the state of financial inclusion 
policies.  
 
Our findings indicate that 56 percent of adults worldwide are unbanked, although the numbers 
differ across high-income and developing countries (17 percent and 64 percent, respectively). 
Overall, we predict a slight improvement in access to financial services in 2009: approximately 
50 million more adults have accounts, although the adult population increased by approximately 
79 million. The results of the econometric analysis confirm the earlier findings in the literature 
that higher deposit and/or loan correlation is associated with higher economic and financial 
development as measured by GDP per capita, the amount of electricity use, the availability of 
explicit deposit insurance and better credit environment, etc. Although access to deposit services 
has improved in 2009, the global financial crisis took its toll: volume of deposits and loans 
shrank. The world as a whole added 65 deposit accounts per 1,000 adults but the number of 
outstanding loans remained more or less the same.
2 At the same time, global retail networks, 
consisting of financial institution branches, ATMs, and POS terminals expanded. Per 100,000 
adults, there are 167 new POS terminals, five ATMs, and one bank branch.  
 
The analysis of data on financial inclusion mandates under the purview of financial regulators 
indicates that financial inclusion is high on policymakers’ agendas and reforms are widespread. 
However, implementation capacity is often limited. Countries that have financial inclusion 
strategy documents also have more topics under the purview of financial regulators with more 
resources. Low-income countries have more topics under the purview of financial regulators, but 
fewer resources.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology and results of 
counting the number of unbanked adults across the world. The state of and changes in access to 
deposit and credit services, as well as in the extent of retail networks, are analyzed in Section 3. 
                                                            
2 These are calculated for a subset of countries with comparable data in 2008 and 2009.  4 
 
Data on financial inclusion mandates and reforms are introduced and analyzed in section 4. 
Section 5 concludes with a discussion.  
 
2  Counting the unbanked  
We follow Beck et al. (2007) to predict the extent of access to formal deposit services offered by 
regulated financial institutions by households according to the following model:  
                       ln
        
 ,           
     ln
        
   ,           
         (1) 
where HH sharei is the percentage of adults with a bank account in country i based on various 
household surveys collected on or after 2006. This data are compiled from various sources: 
recent Living Standard Measurement Surveys (World Bank, various years) where available, as 
well as regional sources: for the European Union, the European Commission’s Eurobarometer, 
Special Barometer 260 (2007); for Africa, FinMark Trust’s FinScope; for Latin America, 
Tejerina and Westley (2007), the MECOVI database, and Barr et al. (2007); and Nenova et al. 
(2007). These data are referenced and expanded upon in Claessens (2006), Honohan (2008), 
Gasparini et al. (2005) and Beck et al.  (2007). See Table 1 for further details. Note that although 
some of these surveys are at the household level and some are at the individual level, Honohan 
(2008) argues that they can be used interchangeably.  
Beck et al. (2007) point out that the logarithmic specification on the right-hand-side of (1) is due 
to outreach indicators having fat tails. Note also that the dependent variable takes values between 
zero and one only, and to avoid the predicted values from falling outside this range, it is possible 
to estimate equation (1) using a Tobit specification. Beck et al. also state that the coefficients and 
significance levels are similar under Tobit and OLS, which is also confirmed by our estimation 
results. Nevertheless, for the predicted values to lie within zero and one as well, Tobit 
specification is preferred. Table 2 provides the results from estimating equation (1) by both OLS 
and Tobit using 46 observations. As expected, a larger number of accounts and a larger number 
of branches per adult are associated with a greater percentage of banked households. The model 
is then used to predict the percentage of banked households for the rest of the world for which 
household survey data do not exist. The correlation between the actual and predicted values is 87 
percent. See Figure 1 for the fit of the estimated model.  
Given the data constraints for the explanatory variables, it is possible to construct out-of-sample 
predictions for 55 countries. Combined with the actual data available for 46 countries, this 
enables us to pin down the percentage of banked households for a total of 101 countries. Kendall 
et al. (2010) develop a different methodology and predict the number of accounts for each type 
of regulated financial institution in the Financial Access database. They then convert the number 
of accounts into the number of banked adults. With this methodology, they are able to predict the 5 
 
percentage of banked adults for a total of 154 countries. We use their predictions for those 
countries for which data on explanatory variables in equation (1) were not available, and end up 
with 154 countries for which there are predictions or actual data on the percentage of formally 
banked households. The results indicate that, on average, half the world is unbanked. The 
regional breakdown of these predictions shows that Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia 
(SA) are the two regions with the lowest percentage of banked individuals, with medians of 12 
and 22 percent, respectively. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP), and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) follow with medians of 40, 42 and 42 
percent, respectively. In the developing world, Europe and Central Asia (ECA) is the region with 
the highest percentage of banked households on average, with a median of 50 percent. High-
income OECD and non-OECD countries have 91 percent of households banked on average.
3  
The next step is to calculate the number of unbanked adults in the world. Kendall et al. (2010) 
predict that approximately 2.7 billion adults in the developing world and 160 million adults in 
the developed countries are unbanked using data from Financial Access 2009 as well as other 
sources. As their methodology differs, the predictions based on the methodology presented above 
are not comparable to their numbers. Hence, we then redo the prediction exercise with the 
methodology of Kendall et al. using updated data from Financial Access 2010 to understand if 
there is a major change in the number of unbanked adults. In doing so, we also update the 
predictions of Kendall et al. by expanding their coverage. In the end, using the methodology of 
Kendall et al., we arrive at two sets of predictions: one for 2008, and the other for 2009, both 
complemented with additional data from a variety of sources (see Table 3) and for the same 
sample of 191 countries.  
Kendall et al. (2010) use a variety of econometric models to predict the number of commercial 
bank deposit accounts around the world. Table 4 provides the estimation results for the two sets 
of predictions mentioned above, which are almost identical to the results reported by Kendall et 
al.  using  Financial Access 2009 data. We then use these models to predict the number of 
commercial bank deposit accounts for those countries for which data are unavailable. For the rest 
of the non-bank financial institution types, no estimation was made as the number of comparable 
observations at the country level is not sufficient. In addition, not all countries have different 
types of non-bank financial institutions. Instead, Financial Access data for both years are 
complemented by other data sources (see Table 3), and the number of deposit accounts for each 
institution type for each reporting country is counted. The total number of deposit accounts 
across all institutional types within each country is then calculated by adding up the numbers for 
each institutional type. This prediction exercise yields the total number of deposit accounts in 
each country. However, the indicator of interest is the total number of banked (or unbanked) 
adults (see Table 3). Hence, following Kendall et al., we convert the number of deposit accounts 
                                                            
3 See Map 1.1 in CGAP and World Bank (2010), pp.4. 6 
 
to the number of individuals with an account by using their estimate that, on average, each 
individual has 3 deposit accounts.
4  
As a result of this exercise we revise the estimate by Kendall et al. (2010) for the number of 
unbanked: as of December 2008, we predict that approximately 2.8 billion adults are unbanked, 
175 million of which are in high-income countries, and 2.63 billion are in the developing world. 
These numbers imply that 58 percent of the world is unbanked (21 percent of adults in high-
income countries, and 66 percent in developing countries). The numbers slightly improve by the 
end of 2009. A total of approximately 2.75 billion adults around the world are predicted to be 
unbanked, out of which 138 million live in high-income countries and 2.61 billion live in 
developing countries. Overall, 56 percent of the world is unbanked by the end of 2009, with 17 
percent of adults unbanked in high-income countries and 64 percent in developing countries. 
Hence, about 50 million more adults in the world have bank accounts, and most of the 
improvement is seen in high-income countries.  Note that, at the same time, the total adult 
population in the world increased by approximately 79 million. 
 
3  Access to financial services 
This section presents the state of access to financial services in 2009. We consider deposit and 
credit services only, as these are the basics. For both deposit services and credit services, we 
provide an overview of the global picture and summarize the results of econometric analyses. 
We also compare banks to non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) in terms of deposit and loan 
penetration, although data on NBFIs are limited. Next, we consider the outreach of the financial 
system. An overview of the state of retail networks, including branches, ATMs, and POS 
terminals as well as urban vs. rural, and bank vs. non-bank divides are presented.  
Note that due to limitations in data availability, especially in time dimension, it is not possible to 
control for potential endogeneity problems between financial service penetration and other 
indicators of growth and development. Hence, the econometric results reported below should be 
interpreted with caution, as they are likely not to point to causal effects but are rather partial 
associations. Furthermore, the data are from a crisis year, which may bias the results.  
3.1  Deposits 
In 2009 as the global financial crisis unfolded, about 60 percent of countries experienced a 
decline in real per capita GDP, and for those that went through expansions, median growth was 
only 2.1 percent. Deteriorating macroeconomic conditions affected the deposit volume around 
the globe as individuals and firms had to tap into their savings. Seventy-seven percent of 
countries in our sample experienced a decline in deposit-to-GDP ratio, with an average decline 
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of 11.8 percent. The overall world deposit-to-GDP ratio decreased from 72 percent at the end of 
2008 to 66 percent at the end of 2009. 
Yet even in the midst of the crisis, the use of financial services continued to expand. The number 
of deposit accounts per 1,000 adults increased in 69 percent of the countries reporting data. The 
world as a whole added 65 accounts per 1,000 adults in 2009, which is roughly a 10 percent 
increase in the median number of accounts per 1,000 adults. Growth has been uneven across 
countries, however, and the median change was only 4.3 percent. 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the main indicators used in this part of the analysis 
(commercial banks). The table also shows substantial variance among countries in the different 
indicators. Changes in volume of deposits and number of deposit accounts differ substantially 
across regions. Europe and Central Asia, where the financial system was severely affected by the 
crisis, is the region that experienced the largest declines in deposit volumes.  
Europe and Central Asia is also one of the regions that performed significantly worse than the 
rest of the world, with a decline in the number of deposit accounts of 1 percent. Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the region with the lowest level of deposit account penetration, experienced the second 
largest median increase in the number of deposit accounts per 1,000 adults, surpassed only by 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Both regions have experienced increases significantly larger 
than the rest of the world. 
The variation in changes in the number of deposit accounts and the volume of deposits exhibit 
similar patterns across income groups. Middle-income and high-income countries on average 
experienced a significantly larger decline in volume of deposits as a percentage of GDP than did 
the low end of the world income distribution, mostly because of the effect of the financial crisis. 
Though the largest median increase in deposit account penetration is observed in the poorest 20 
percent of countries, the richest 20 percent have seen only a slight expansion.  
A thorough analysis of the cross-country covariates of deposit account penetration implies that 
the level of economic development is of great consequence. Table 6 reports the results of various 
models estimated by OLS with the number of deposit accounts per 1,000 adults in commercial 
banks as the dependent variable. GDP per capita and population density are both significantly 
and positively associated with deposit account penetration, confirming the results by Kendall et 
al. (2010). Hence, in what follows, we control for GDP per capita and population density and 
discuss partial associations with the rest of the variables.  
Indicators of overall macroeconomic conditions apart from GDP per capita are not significant.  
Inflation rate, which was significant with a negative coefficient in Kendall et al. is not 
statistically significant with 2009 data. To control for the effects of the global financial crisis, we 
used a variable that we named as “expected real economic growth,” which is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of one if the actual real GDP growth in 2008 was negative and the 
expected real GDP growth for 2009 is positive, to capture a positive economic outlook for a 8 
 
country. The source of the expected real GDP growth data is World Economic Outlook by the 
IMF (IMF, April 2010). According to our results, this variable is not statistically significant. 
Deposit rate, on the other hand, is significantly positively correlated with the number of deposit 
accounts.  
Among the infrastructure indicators, electricity consumption does not have a significant 
relationship with deposit penetration, whereas the number of land line and cell phone users is 
positively correlated with the number of deposit accounts. Financial sector infrastructure 
indicators, such as the number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults and per 1,000 
square kilometer that measure the geographic and demographic outreach of the financial system, 
are positively and significantly related to deposit penetration. 
The legal environment, measured by the index of the strength of legal rights for borrowers and 
lenders, is also closely related to deposit penetration. A favorable legal environment for lending 
may enable banks to operate more profitably through lending and to grow, eventually leading to 
an expansion of deposit services. The analysis of the correlation between deposit account 
penetration and other indicators of favorable credit environment also produces similar findings. 
Moreover, the availability of explicit deposit insurance scheme suggests higher deposit 
penetration.  
A greater degree of competition, as proxied by the concentration ratio in the banking sector, is 
associated with greater deposit penetration. This is in line with earlier studies (see, for example, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999) arguing that competition in the banking sector would 
increase efficiency, and in turn, would lead to a larger variety of products and services offered to 
a larger depositor base.
5 The analysis of the correlation between the interest rate spread (lending 
rate minus deposit rate) and deposit account penetration lends support to this argument (not 
shown in Table 6). Countries with lower interest rate spreads also show a higher number of 
deposit accounts per 1,000 adults.  
Analysis of the volume of deposits normalized by GDP offers further insight into the factors 
affecting financial access (Table 7). Although inflation, as a proxy of macroeconomic stability, is 
not significantly correlated with the number of deposit accounts, it is negatively related to 
deposit volume. In other words, macroeconomic stability seems to matter for the decision of how 
much money to put in the bank account, but not for having an account at all. This result is 
consistent with the evidence of a simultaneous decrease in deposit volume and increase in 
number of accounts despite the financial crisis. It also supports the view that a deposit account is 
a basic service, and having one is inelastic with respect to macroeconomic disturbances. 
The analysis of the changes in the number of deposit accounts per 1,000 adults between 2008 
and 2009 highlights the importance of macroeconomic stability and growth for improving 
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financial access. The change in the number of accounts per 1,000 adults is strongly positively 
correlated with macroeconomic outlook, measured by short-run forecasts of real per capita GDP 
growth. In addition, lower deposit penetration at the end of 2008 is positively associated with a 
greater change in the number of deposit accounts per 1,000 adults.  
A number of other macro and policy environment variables were tested and showed weak 
correlations after controlling for income per capita (Table 8). Overall, the results indicate that 
access to basic deposit services continues to improve, but macroeconomic stability and growth 
are essential for sustainable improvement in financial access. 
3.1.1  Banks vs. non-banks in access to deposit services 
Robust analysis of the changes in the number and volume of deposits between banks and non 
banks is not feasible due to data limitations.
6 Only 73 countries were able to provide data on the 
breakdown of deposits by the type of depositors and financial institutions. Estimates from the 
smaller subset of countries with comparable data suggest that commercial banks experienced a 
larger decline on average in deposit-to-GDP ratio than non-banks, while also enjoying a larger 
median increase in the number of accounts per 1,000 adults.  
Banks are the main providers of deposit services around the world. The majority of the deposit 
volume by both individuals and non-financial businesses are in commercial banks. 91 percent of 
total deposit volume and 94 percent of total deposit accounts are held in commercial banks. 
These numbers should be interpreted with caution, as they are likely to underestimate the share 
of deposits held by non-banks due to limited reporting on deposit volumes and especially on the 
number of accounts for non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). 
Deposits by individuals account for the vast majority of deposit volume. Deposits held by 
individuals account for 71 percent of the total volume of deposits and 96 percent of the number 
of accounts. Individual deposits represent a greater share of bank deposit volume (76 percent) as 
well as a greater share of deposit volume in NBFIs (86 percent).  
3.2  Loans 
Credit services fared much worse than deposits in 2009. Indeed, the global financial crisis took 
its toll on access to credit services, with the value of loans as a percentage of world GDP 
declining from 74 percent to 65 percent. In about 85 percent of countries, loan volume as a share 
of GDP declined in 2009. At the same time throughout the year, the number of outstanding loans 
per 1,000 adults remained more or less unchanged. The number of outstanding loans per 1,000 
adults decreased in 57 percent of the countries. Table 5 presents the summary statistics for these 
indicators aggregated at the world level and also at the regional level. The differences in median 
changes in commercial bank loan volume (as a percentage of GDP) show less variation across 
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countries than median changes in the number of loans. Loan volume as a percentage of GDP 
dropped in all regions. 
Although all regions have seen contractions in lending volumes, there is significant variance 
amongst regions. Europe and Central Asia, where the financial system was severely affected by 
the crisis, experienced the largest decline in lending volumes. All the countries in that region for 
which data are available experienced drops in loans-to-GDP ratios ranging between 19 percent 
and 52 percent. All countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, but one, also experienced 
declines in lending volumes. For the number of outstanding loan accounts, the picture differs. 
Some regions have even seen improvements in loan account penetration. For instance, all 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, except for Israel, underwent expansions in the 
number of outstanding loans. Conversely, all countries in Europe and Central Asia, except for 
Albania and Turkey, have had contractions in the number of outstanding loans.  
Table 9 presents the regression results where the dependent variable is the number of outstanding 
commercial bank loans per 1,000 adults. Confirming the findings by Kendall et al. (2010), we 
find that while GDP per capita is significantly positively associated with loan penetration, 
population density is insignificant. On the other hand, the number of outstanding loans is 
negatively correlated with inflation. Branch penetration and physical infrastructure indicators 
such as phone lines per capita are significantly positively related to loan penetration.  
The link between loan penetration and banking sector concentration is negative, indicating that 
more competitive banking markets have higher levels of credit access. Better creditor rights and 
comprehensive credit information systems are associated with greater access to financial 
services. The minimum amount of consumer loans that banks make as a percentage of GSDP per 
capita, as a non-price barrier to accessing credit services, is significantly negatively related to 
number of outstanding loans.  
There is also a positive link between the existence of explicit deposit insurance and loan 
penetration. Similar to the effect of credit rights on deposits, this indicates that to improve access 
to financial services, a favorable business climate that supports both deposit and loan services is 
essential. Sustainable improvement in access to credit is possible only if sustainable financial 
institutions are able to effectively manage both the asset and liability sides of their balance 
sheets. 
Loan volume as a ratio to GDP is significantly positively related to GDP per capita and 
population density, and negatively related to inflation and lending rate (Table 10). Offshore 
financial centers have larger loan volumes as a percentage of GDP, after controlling for income 
per capita and population density. Branch penetration and allowing agents to provide credit 
related services are positively related to loan volume, in addition to a favorable credit 
environment measured by legal rights of borrowers and lenders, and better credit information 
systems. 11 
 
Countries with higher expected GDP levels are more likely to experience an increase in the 
number of loans per 1,000 adults (Table 11). This also means that countries where 
macroeconomic expectations are negative are more likely to experience decreases in loan 
numbers as demand shrinks and banks tighten supply as credit quality deteriorates. Increase in 
loan penetration is larger for countries with a smaller number of outstanding loans to start with, 
indicating that even after controlling for expected GDP—a proxy for macroeconomic stability—
access to credit continues to expand. The implications of these results are twofold. First, similar 
to deposit services, there is evidence that access to financial services is improving, albeit slowly. 
Second, macroeconomic stability is fundamental for access to credit services. 
3.2.1   Banks vs. non-banks in access to credit services 
Comparison of the data provided by regulators on loans granted by banks and nonbanks is 
difficult for the same reasons highlighted earlier with regard to deposit services. The subset of 
countries with comparable data on the number of loans includes only 19 countries. The numbers 
are even smaller for specialized state financial institutions and microfinance institutions: 15 and 
7 countries, respectively. In all cases, the average percentage change in the number of loans is 
not statistically significantly different from zero, similar to commercial banks. 
The decline in loan volume is essentially even across different financial institutions. 
Nevertheless, NBFIs have experienced an increase, on average, in the number of loans per 1,000 
adults, the median increase being 9 percent. It is important to note, however, that a number of 
countries in the sample which did not report any data on some or all types of NBFIs in 2009 did 
so in 2010, leading to a possible overestimation of the changes in loan volume. 
Among the regulated financial institutions, banks hold 87 percent of loans-to-GDP ratio and 81 
percent of number of outstanding loans per 1,000 adults.  Among NBFIs, cooperatives and credit 
unions are the major source of credit by volume as well as by number, though the structure of the 
NBFI sector varies greatly from country to country.  For example, in Spain and France, 
cooperatives account for at least half the credit volume while in South Korea, specialized state 
financial institutions account for nearly 67 percent of the volume.  
Loans to firms represent 43.5 percent of the credit portfolio by value, but only 17.4 percent in 
terms of number.  Banks are the main providers of credit to firms, while NBFIs are more often 
geared towards serving individuals in terms of volume. Nevertheless, the number of outstanding 
loans to individuals by banks constitutes the bulk of bank loans by number, if not by volume. 
3.3  Outreach 
Global retail networks, consisting of financial institution branches, ATMs, and POS terminals, 
expanded in 2009. The world on average added about one bank branch, five ATMs, and 167 
POS terminals per 100,000 adults. However, this growth was not universal. The number of bank 
branches decreased in 43 percent of countries, about half of which are high-income and Eastern 12 
 
European countries. The number of ATMs decreased in 16 out of 104 countries, and the number 
of POS terminals decreased in 13 out of 77. 
Growth in the retail network varies across regions and income groups. Low-income countries 
show the highest rates of growth in the number of bank branches, ATMs, and POS terminals, 
which is another sign of improved access to financial services. Africa, South Asia, and the 
Middle East, the regions with the lowest levels of retail network outreach, show higher rates of 
growth in the number of bank branches and ATMs. 
The growth in low-income countries starts from a low base, especially for ATM and POS 
numbers, and the increase in coverage is less pronounced. For example, a 27 percent increase in 
the number of ATMs in Malaysia translates into an increase in coverage by more than 10 ATMs 
per 100,000 adults, but an equivalent percentage change in Kenya adds only 1.6 ATMs per 
100,000 adults. At the extreme, Burundi doubled the number of ATMs but still has only about 
0.08 ATMs per 100,000 adults—a total of four ATMs in the entire country. Less dramatic 
examples are Syria (with 366 ATMs) and Malawi (with 203 ATMs)—both doubled the number 
of ATMs, resulting in coverage of 2.6 ATMs per 100,000 adults. Overall, patterns of retail 
network outreach are broadly unchanged. 
Tables 12 and 13 show the regression results where demographic penetration of branches—
measured by number of branches per 100,000 adults—and geographic penetration of branches—
measured by number of branches per square kilometer—are used as dependent variables, 
respectively. While GDP per capita, and number of phone users are significantly positively 
associated with both measures of branch penetration, population density is significantly 
positively associated only with geographic branch penetration. No other variable is found to have 
a statistically significant relationship with branch penetration.  
Table 14 reports the partial association between changes in branch penetration and relevant 
indicators. The statistically significant results indicate that countries with lower branch 
penetration to start with have larger increases in branch penetration. Moreover, change in the 
number of banks is positively related to change in the number of branches. Regional dummies 
for East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, high income, and offshore financial 
center dummies all have significant coefficient estimates with negative signs, indicating 
countries in those groups experienced decreases in branch penetration.  
3.3.1  Branches vs. non-branch retail locations 
Despite the fast growth, ATM and POS networks remain small relative to branch networks in 
low and middle-income countries. In 2009 the average number of ATMs barely exceeded the 
number of bank branches in low-income countries for the first time.  There are two ATMs per 
bank branch in middle-income countries and three per bank branch in high-income countries.  In 
South Asia the ratio is the lowest – on average there is one ATM for two bank branches.  It is 
important to note that a greater number of ATMs does not automatically mean better access.  For 13 
 
example, lack of interoperability in the system requiring each bank to build its own ATM 
network raises overall cost.
7  Still, the magnitude of variation between regions and income 
groups is indicative of the physical reach of the existing retail network. 
As new technologies evolve, the trends in the use of ATMs and POS are changing.  Data show 
that the number of ATMs relative to the number of branches slightly declined in high-income 
countries.  At the same time the number of POS increased, reflecting a growing reliance on non-
cash payments.  A greater use of electronic transactions through internet and cell phones may 
also reduce the need for ATMs going forward.  For now though, as cash remains the main 
medium of exchange for retail transactions in most countries, cash-in-cash-out points, whether it 
be branches, ATMs or POS allowing cash-back, are essential elements of financial access. 
3.3.2  Banks vs. nonbanks in retail networks  
Worldwide, banks have the largest branch network representing two-thirds of all branches.   
Cooperatives are the second largest with 23 percent of branches worldwide (Figure 2).  In over 
60 percent of countries (52 out of 83) with the data, non-banks had half the number of branches 
of commercial banks. The number of cooperative branches exceeds the number of bank branches 
only in a small number of countries, namely Austria, Burundi, Germany, Hungary, Korea, and 
Spain. Figure 2 likely underestimates the size of the nonbank branch network due to data 
limitations for non-banks.   
Commercial banks mainly target urban areas.  Most bank branches are located in urban areas, 
representing 90 percent of all financial institutions in urban areas.  On average, only 24 percent 
of all bank branches are in rural areas, compared to 40 percent in cooperatives and specialized 
state financial institutions and 50 percent in microfinance institutions (Figure 2). Even though a 
smaller share of bank branches is located in rural areas, they still provide the bulk of rural 
coverage.   
Data limitations do not allow for a robust change analysis in bank versus non-bank branch 
network.   The challenge is threefold. First, in a number of countries information on a larger 
number of NBFIs is not available. Second, financial institutions changed their status by 
becoming banks in a number of countries.  Third, only partial data are available, distorting 
comparison of banks and non-banks within the system.  For a small subset of countries with 
comparable data for banks and non-banks (45 countries), there is no statistically significant 
difference in the growth rate of bank and non-bank branch networks. 
 
4 Financial  inclusion  agenda 
In addition to collecting fundamental indicators on financial access, the survey also explores the 
extent to which financial regulators are mandated to oversee financial inclusion. Historically, the 
                                                            
7 See, for example, Saloner and Shepard (1995) and Prager (1999). 14 
 
main role of the financial regulator has been to ensure the stability of the financial system, 
focusing on regulation and supervision for the safety and soundness of financial institutions. 
With many countries embracing financial inclusion as a reform objective and putting in place 
programs to expand financial access, some regulators are playing a more promotional role as 
well. However, recent financial crises underscored the dilemma of choice between encouraging 
financial sector growth, especially credit, and maintaining the stability of the financial system.  
4.1   Financial inclusion mandates and reforms 
The survey asked financial regulators which of the following topics relevant for a financial 
inclusion agenda were under the purview of their agency: consumer protection, financial 
capability, regulation of microfinance, promotion of savings, promotion of access to finance for 
SMEs, and promotion of rural finance. 
We find that 86 percent of countries in the sample have at least one element of financial 
inclusion under their responsibility. Seventy-one percent of countries stated they have at least 
two elements of financial inclusion under their responsibility. About half have at least three, and 
only 17 percent of the countries in our sample have all elements of financial inclusion under their 
mandate.  
Regulators from developing countries tend to be more concerned with final inclusion as a policy 
objective. They have, on average, more topics under their mandate than developed countries do 
(3.34 versus 2.13 out of a maximum of 6). Consumer protection and financial literacy are the 
topics that seem to be important across all regions but developing countries also seem to place a 
lot of emphasis on the rest of the topics as well.  A plausible explanation could be that richer 
countries have already achieved higher levels of inclusion and do not have the need to actively 
pursue policy goals in this respect. However, consumer protection and financial literacy are 
topics that are always relevant especially in the light of the recent financial crisis. 
The survey also asked regulators whether there were reforms in the following ten areas in 2009: 
(1) consumer protection, (2) financial literacy, (3) basic accounts, (4) government-to-person 
transfers, (5) access to finance in rural areas, (6) microfinance, (7) know-your-customer (KYC) 
requirements, (8) access to finance by SMEs, (9) branchless banking, and (10) over-
indebtedness. Consumer protection is the most popular area of reform, followed by KYC 
requirements, access to finance by SMEs, microfinance, access to finance in rural areas, and 
financial literacy. The remaining four areas are not as popular. Consumer protection reforms are 
especially popular in high-income countries. Reforms are widespread in South Asia. East Asia 
and Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Middle East and North 




4.2 Strategy  documents 
Not only is financial inclusion high on regulators’ agenda but we also find that many regulators 
draft comprehensive financial inclusion strategy documents in order to help them advance their 
policy objectives. Forty-five percent of regulators in the sample have produced such documents, 
and have done so recently. Two-thirds of countries that report the existence of financial inclusion 
strategy documents have drafted them in the last three years and 91 percent have done so after 
2004. In addition, we find that countries that have strategy documents also have more topics 
under their responsibility and more resources allocated to achieving their financial inclusion 
objectives. 
4.3  Resource gap  
Low-income countries, in addition to more pressing financial inclusion needs with lower levels 
of access and with more financial inclusion topics under the responsibility of the regulators, need 
to manage with fewer resources available to overcome their challenges. One possible measure of 
the resource gap is to count the existing teams or units within regulators that work on topics in 
the financial inclusion agenda which are under the purview of their agencies. According to the 
survey, many regulators have more topics under their responsibility than teams and staff working 
on these topics. The problem is even more severe for low-income countries. 
4.4  Cross-country covariates of financial inclusion mandates and reforms 
Table 15 summarizes the output of selected econometric analyses on the partial association 
between the existence of various types of financial inclusion mandates and reforms, and deposit 
penetration. The results show a negative correlation, suggesting the possibility that the direction 
of causality may, in fact, run from the extent of financial access to the number of items in the 
financial inclusion agenda and reforms. We henceforth take this approach and report the results 
of these analyses in Tables 16 to 21. 
We form two indices using data on the six topics of financial inclusion under the purview of 
financial regulators. One index, named as FI index, assigns a value between 0 and 1 to each 
country based on the number of topics under the regulator’s mandate, 0 for no topics and 1 for all 
six topics simultaneously. However, this may not be an ideal measure for the comprehensiveness 
of the regulators’ financial inclusion agenda because it does not provide us with any information 
on the implementation capacity of the regulators. Therefore, we also form a second index, named 
FI effective index, which is also between 0 and 1, that takes into account the topic under purview 
together with the availability of designated staff or teams that work on that topic. In this case, a 
country can have a value of 0 for this index even if it has a value of 1 in the FI index, simply 
because there are no teams designated to work on any one of the topics. A value of 1 for the FI 
effective index means that the regulator has all six topics under its mandate, and each topic has a 
designated team. Although this second index is not an exact measure of if and how the financial 
inclusion agenda is implemented, it is a proxy of implementation capacity. 16 
 
Table 16 uses FI index and FI effective index as dependent variables in Tobit regressions. 
Countries with lower income per capita levels, after controlling for deposit and loan penetration, 
have more topics under the mandate of the regulators. This result also holds for countries with a 
positive economic outlook. The existence of explicit deposit insurance is negatively related to 
both indices, and loan penetration is positively related to the FI effective index. Hence, poorer 
countries seem to have a more loaded financial inclusion agenda.  
The extent of reforms, measured by a similar index constructed using the ten areas of financial 
inclusion reforms surveyed, is also negatively related to GDP per capita, and not related to the 
degree of deposit or loan penetration. However, once the items in the financial inclusion agenda 
are controlled for using the two indices described above, the effect of GDP per capita is no 
longer observed. Countries that have a more loaded financial inclusion agenda seem to have a 
higher number of reforms in 2009 (Table 17), although it is not possible to comment on the 
effectiveness of the reforms. 
When examining specific areas of financial inclusion topics, we find that countries with lower 
GDP per capita and lower deposit penetration are more likely to have promotion of basic 
accounts as a mandate of the regulator with a designated team (Table 18), whereas regulators in 
countries with lower GDP per capita and a positive economic outlook tend to have promoting 
access to finance in rural areas as a mandate (Table 19). Financial consumer protection and 
financial literacy are the two topics that are likely to receive more attention in countries where 
loan penetration is higher (Table 20), but countries with explicit deposit insurance tend to be less 
likely to have financial literacy as a mandate for the regulator with a designated team. Lastly, 
countries with lower GDP per capita levels are more likely to have their regulators work 
effectively on promoting access to finance by SMEs (Table 21).  
 
5      Conclusion 
Using the Financial Access database by CGAP and the World Bank Group, this paper (i) counts 
the number of unbanked adults around the world, (ii) analyzes the state of access to deposit and 
loan services as well as the extent of retail networks, and (iii) discusses the state of financial 
inclusion mandates around the world.  
The findings indicate that there is yet much to be done in the financial inclusion arena. Fifty-six 
percent of adults in the world do not have access to formal financial services. The situation is 
even worse in the developing world with 64 percent of adults unbanked. Nevertheless, high-
income countries also have to worry because approximately one in every five adults is unbanked. 
On the contrary to conventional wisdom, poor people indeed need and use financial services, 
albeit in small amounts and usually from informal sources as it is costly for formal providers to 
provide services for such small amounts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that informal financial 17 
 
services are at least 5-10 times more costly and also less reliable than formal ones. Hence, 
making formal and affordable financial services available for the unbanked would definitely 
have positive consequences on the lives of these people.  
Fortunately, the need for improving access to financial services and building inclusive financial 
systems are increasingly at the core of policymakers’ agendas. The data indicates that access to 
deposit services have improved in 2009 despite the crisis. In addition, financial regulators are 
increasingly assuming the role of promoting financial access besides their traditional roles of 
regulating and supervising financial institutions for the soundness of the financial system and to 
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Table 1: Household survey sources, years and countries 
Country 
% households 
with access to a 
bank account  Source 
Austria 91  Eurobarometer 
Bangladesh  32  Nenova et al. 
Belgium 96  Eurobarometer 
Bolivia  9.9  Tejerina & Westley 
Botswana 41  FINSCOPE 
Brazil  39.7  Barr et al. 
Colombia  39.2  Barr et al. 
Czech Republic  83  Eurobarometer 
Ecuador 35  Honohan 
Estonia 89  Eurobarometer 
France 97  Eurobarometer 
Greece 90  Eurobarometer 
Guatemala 17.8  Claessens 
Hungary 70  Eurobarometer 
India  48  Nenova et al. 
Ireland 89  Eurobarometer 
Italy 69  Eurobarometer 
Kenya 27  FINSCOPE 
Latvia 80  Eurobarometer 
Lesotho 18  FINSCOPE 
Lithuania 78  Eurobarometer 
Malawi 19.1  FINSCOPE 
Mexico  44.1  Barr et al. 
Mozambique 11.8  FINSCOPE 
Namibia 45.3  FINSCOPE 
Netherlands 96  Eurobarometer 
Nigeria 21  FINSCOPE 
Pakistan 11  FINSCOPE 
Panama  35.2  Tejerina & Westley 
Paraguay  3.7  Tejerina & Westley 
Peru  4.5  Tejerina & Westley 
Philippines  26  Nenova et al. 
Poland 70  Eurobarometer 
Rwanda 26  FINSCOPE 
Singapore  98  Nenova et al. 
Slovakia 82  Eurobarometer 
Slovenia 96  Eurobarometer 
South Africa  60  FINSCOPE 
Spain 91  Eurobarometer 
Sri Lanka  59  Nenova et al. 
Swaziland 35.3  FINSCOPE 
Thailand  59  Nenova et al. 
Uganda 18  FINSCOPE 
United Kingdom  93  Eurobarometer 
United States  93  FDIC, U.S. Census 
Zambia 14.6  FINSCOPE 22 
 
Table 2: Prediction models for percentage of banked households 
 OLS  Tobit 
log (Deposits per 1,000 adults)  20.02
*** 20.02
*** 
 (3.62)  (3.54) 
log (Branches per 100,000 adults)  3.65
** 3.65
** 




 (23.05)  (22.53) 
σ  - 16.53 
   (2.08) 
N  46 46
†
R
2  0.72 0.13
± 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is percent of households banked. 
† Number of uncensored observations is 46. 
± Pseudo R
2 is reported for Tobit specification. 
***, 
**, 




Table 3:  Data sources and models used in the estimation of the number of accounts in 




   # countries  %  sample 
%  final count 
2008 
%  final count 
2009 
Actuals 110  58%  59.4%  59.0% 
Model (1)  22  12%  11.1%  11.3% 
Model (2)  7  4%  26.0%  26.3% 
Model (3)  1  1%  0.3%  0.3% 
Model (4)  1  1%  0.1%  0.1% 
Model (5)  25  13%  1.8%  1.8% 
Model (6)  25  13%  1.3%  1.3% 
Totals 191  100%  100%  100% 
 
Cooperatives & Credit Unions 
   # countries  %  sample 
%  final count 
2008 
%  final count 
2009 
Actuals 65  58%  54.6%  54.7% 
WOCCU 38  34%  28.7%  28.7% 
EACB 9  8%  16.6%  16.6% 
Totals  112  100% 100% 100% 
Notes: WOCCU is World Council of Credit Unions; ECBA is European Cooperative 
Banking Association.  
 
Specialized State Financial Institutions 
# countries  %  sample 
%  final count 
2008 
%  final count 
2009 
Actuals 79  59%  61.5%  61.4% 
CGAP "Big Numbers" *  55  41%  38.5%  38.6% 
Totals 134  100%  100%  100% 
Notes: CGAP "Big Numbers" refers to data gathered for CGAP, Occasional Paper No. 8, 2004. 
 
Microfinance Institutions 
   # countries  %  sample 
%  final count 
2008 
%  final count 
2009 
Actuals 95  75%  88.7%  89.4% 
Microfinance Exchange (MIX)  31  25%  11.3%  10.6% 
Totals  126  100% 100% 100% 
Note: MIX numbers are values voluntarily reported by MFIs and aggregated at the country level. 24 
 
Table 4: Prediction models of the number of deposit accounts in commercial banks 
This table shows the estimates of OLS regressions of the number of deposit accounts in commercial 
banks per thousand adults on several covariates. Each column represents a different regression. The 
dependent variable in each regression is ln(Number of accounts in commercial banks per 1,000 adults). 












ln(GDP/capita)  0.540*** 0.696*** 0.530*** 0.687*** 0.864*** 
(0.117) (0.101) (0.114) (0.101) (0.085) 
High Income dummy  -1.035*** -1.167*** -1.026*** -1.153*** -1.170*** 1.225*** 
(0.319) (0.326) (0.323) (0.330) (0.328) (0.220) 
ln(Population Density)  0.095 0.110 0.117 0.131  0.212**  0.110 
(0.081) (0.101) (0.074) (0.093) (0.099) (0.112) 
ln(Private Cradit/GDP)  0.262 0.367**  0.327**  0.428*** 
(0.172) (0.165) (0.142) (0.152) 
ln(Branches/100,000 Adults)  0.324** 0.333** 
(0.145) (0.143) 
ln(Value Deposits/GDP)  0.149 0.134 
(0.159) (0.157) 
Constant  1.330 0.841 1.248 0.795 -1.415  5.572*** 
(1.034) (1.224) (1.006) (1.189) (0.951) (0.525) 
Observations  77 78 78 79 83 85 
R-squared  0.729 0.695 0.725 0.689 0.672 0.172 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.706 0.674 0.706 0.672 0.659 0.152 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
















ln(GDP/capita)  0.568*** 0.668*** 0.570*** 0.709*** 0.815*** 
(0.119) (0.099) (0.113) (0.090) (0.073) 
High Income dummy  -0.786*** -0.878*** -0.801*** -0.977*** -0.874*** 1.412*** 
(0.276) (0.256) (0.272) (0.255) (0.274) (0.209) 
ln(Population Density)  0.092 0.088  0.132*  0.144  0.206**  0.095 
(0.077) (0.092) (0.072) (0.088) (0.090) (0.101) 
ln(Private Cradit/GDP)  0.116 0.194 0.212  0.317** 
(0.208) (0.185) (0.142) (0.140) 
ln(Branches/100,000 Adults)  0.225 0.259* 
(0.155) (0.150) 
ln(Value Deposits/GDP)  0.231 0.228 
(0.206) (0.195) 
Constant  1.268 1.055 0.872 0.366 -1.118  5.638*** 
(1.064) (1.145) (1.031) (1.105) (0.826) (0.462) 
Observations  83 83 89 91 98  100 
R-squared  0.701 0.687 0.721 0.718 0.681 0.204 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.677 0.667 0.704 0.705 0.670 0.188 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                   
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Table 5: Summary statistics 
   N  Mean  Std. Dev.  25%  Median  75% 
Commercial Banks (% Change)         
Value deposit accounts / GDP  97  -.116 .162 -.217 -.119 -.033 
Deposit accounts / Adult population  74 .064  .112  -.016  .040  .104 
Value loans / GDP  92  -.157  .173  -.264  -.158  -.053 
Loans / Adult population  56  .012 .171 .072 .012 .094 
        
Latin America & the Caribbean (% Change)        
Value deposit accounts / GDP  18  .10 .146  -.141  -.103  -.035 
Deposit accounts / Adult population  15  .088 .102 .019 .082 .119 
Value loans / GDP  16  -.178  .129  -.242  -.182  -119 
Loans / Adult population  13  .038 .151 -.06 -.009 .056 
        
East Asia & Pacific (% Change)        
Value deposit accounts / GDP  10  -.040 -.108 -.119 -.081 .019 
Deposit accounts / Adult population  8 .023  .111  -.036  -.031  .061 
Value loans / GDP  10  -.117  .106  -.136  -.089  -.052 
Loans / Adult population  7  .017 .054 .016 .010 -.090 
        
Europe & Central Asia (% Change)        
Value deposit accounts / GDP  18  -.198 .204 -.283 -.220 -.094 
Deposit accounts / Adult population  11 .004  .114  -.052  -.011  -.065 
Value loans / GDP  19  -.290  .116  -.373  -.270  -.192 
Loans / Adult population  12  -.056 .096 -.126 -.061 -.009 
        
Sub-Saharan Africa (% Change)        
Value deposit accounts / GDP  12  -.126 .135 -218 -.124 -.066 
Deposit accounts / Adult population  17  .111 .127 .031 .087 .234 
Value loans / GDP  13  -.102  .261  -.227  -.147  -.019 
Loans / Adult population  12  -.006 .261 -.199 -.003 .182 
        
Middle East & North Africa (% Change)        
Value deposit accounts / GDP  8  -.153 .156 -.256 -.185 -.063 
Deposit accounts / Adult population  8 .050  .084  -.004  .028  .090 
Value loans / GDP  7  -.154  .121  -.261  -.183  -.052 
Loans / Adult population  6  .162 .160 .074 .117 .250 
        
South Asia (% Change)        
Value deposit accounts / GDP  5  -.024 .133 -.112 .021 .080 
Deposit accounts / Adult population  4 .027  .048  -.002  .009  .057 
Value loans / GDP  4  -.109  .158  -.240  -.113  .019 
Loans / Adult population  4  -.089 .166 -.221 -.101 .043 
        
High Income (% Change)        
Value deposit accounts / GDP  23  -.100 .164 -.197 -.130 -.007 
Deposit accounts / Adult population  11 .074  .121  -.004  .036  .148 
Value loans / GDP  23  -.091  .175  -.189  -.106  .017 





Table 6: Cross-country covariates associated with deposit account penetration 
The results of OLS regressions of the natural logarithm of number of deposit accounts per 1,000 adults in commercial banks on different country 
characteristics.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 























(0.055) (0.053) (0.078) (0.083) (0.062) (0.057) (0.053) (0.162) (0.109) (0.068) (0.055) (0.067) 





















(0.064) (0.056) (0.130) (0.065) (0.070) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) 
Branches per adult (log)  0.244* 
(0.125) 
Branches per km
2 (log)  0.243** 
(0.114) 










Electricity consumption  0.110 
(0.175) 




Absence of violence  0.023 
(0.095) 
Offshore financial center  -0.109 
(0.300) 
Deposit rate  0.047** 
(0.019) 
Constant  0.716 -0.046  3.738**  4.211**  -0.356 -0.514 0.421 0.955 -0.074 0.839 -0.082 -0.695 
(0.484) (0.579) (1.748) (1.694) (0.899) (0.663) (0.514) (0.612) (0.638) (0.694) (0.590) (0.679) 
N  100  99 93 85 97 94 98 76 73 88 99 70 
Adjusted R
2  0.630 0.673 0.690 0.648 0.674 0.681 0.711 0.581 0.706 0.636 0.669 0.678 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 (continued)  
 
    (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.552***  0.696***  0.611***  0.600***  0.596*** 0.585*** 0.584*** 0.572*** 0.638*** 0.533*** 0.519*** 
(0.050) (0.069) (0.058) (0.069) (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.058) (0.052) (0.055) (0.060) 
Population density (log)  0.073  0.199*** 0.179***  0.153**  0.169*** 0.169***  0.153** 0.148**  0.181***  0.164**  0.191*** 
(0.068) (0.065) (0.063) (0.071) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) (0.069) (0.062) (0.061) 
Concentration -0.882** 
(0.438) 
Registry coverage  -0.002 
(0.003) 
KYC requirements  0.039 
(0.038) 
KYC exceptions  0.196 
(0.161) 
Low-fee accounts  0.096 
(0.192) 
Tax incentives  0.103 
(0.158) 
Agents (savings)  0.299 
(0.180) 
Postal system (private operator)  0.236 
(0.160) 
Credit legal rights  0.066* 
(0.036) 
Credit rank  -0.004** 
(0.002) 
Credit information index  0.103** 
(0.047) 
Constant 2.216***  -0.210  0.475  0.775  0.765 0.838 0.878 1.002 -0.078  1.604**  0.951* 
(0.650) (0.620) (0.718) (0.710) (0.575) (0.581) (0.581) (0.606) (0.575) (0.644) (0.548) 
N  86 99 88 68 88 88 87 88 99 88 88 
Adjusted R
2  0.636 0.670 0.640 0.621 0.637 0.637 0.642 0.643 0.682 0.658 0.660 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 7: Cross-country covariates associated with deposit volume 
The results of OLS regressions of the natural logarithm of value of deposit accounts in commercial banks over GDP on different country 
characteristics.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.219*** 0.178*** 0.177*** 0.231*** 0.179*** 0.241***  0.135  0.153**  0.189*** 0.199*** 0.200*** 
(0.029) (0.049) (0.052) (0.047) (0.036) (0.032) (0.100) (0.072) (0.045) (0.029) (0.045) 
Population density (log)  0.158***  0.148*** 0.067  0.120** 0.102*  0.161*** 0.177*** 0.210*** 0.173*** 0.117*** 0.165*** 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.079) (0.056) (0.056) (0.038) (0.045) (0.045) (0.040) (0.034) (0.044) 
Branches per adult (log)  0.104 
(0.067) 
Branches per km
2 (log)  0.090 
(0.064) 
Expected real economic growth  0.053 
(0.131) 
Inflation  -0.025*** 
(0.008) 
Deposit insurance  -0.148 
(0.118) 
Electricity consumption  0.068 
(0.097) 
Land line and cell phone users  0.128 
(0.128) 
Absence of violence  0.066 
(0.083) 
Offshore financial center  0.824*** 
(0.245) 
Interest spread  -0.031** 
(0.014) 
Constant  -3.326*** -1.981*  -2.122**  -3.352***  -2.514***  -3.433*** -3.187*** -3.612*** -3.135*** -3.025*** -2.932*** 
(0.309) (1.014) (1.037) (0.437) (0.394) (0.312) (0.355) (0.363) (0.420) (0.287) (0.510) 
N  118 113 109 119 113 116  99  84  113 118  77 
Adjusted R
2  0.349 0.388 0.381 0.191 0.266 0.351 0.294 0.410 0.343 0.417 0.394 
Robust standard errors in brackets 




Table 7 (continued)  
 
    (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.218*** 0.191*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.219*** 0.204*** 0.209*** 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.226*** 0.531*** 
(0.031) (0.059) (0.032) (0.034) (0.030) (0.034) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.035) (0.060) 
Population density (log)  0.166***  0.126**  0.170*** 0.144*** 0.168*** 0.172*** 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.154*** 0.170***  0.134* 
(0.043) (0.055) (0.041) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.080) 
Concentration  0.176 
(0.268) 
Registry coverage  0.003 
(0.002) 
KYC requirements  0.016 
(0.028) 
KYC exceptions  0.222* 
(0.132) 
Low-fee accounts  -0.068 
(0.150) 
Tax incentives  0.105 
(0.120) 
Agents (savings)  0.145 
(0.128) 
Postal system (private operator)  0.025 
(0.117) 
Credit legal rights  0.007 
(0.022) 
Credit rank  0.001 
(0.001) 
Credit information index  0.103** 
(0.049) 
Constant  -3.477*** -3.074*** -3.458*** -3.349*** -3.359*** -3.298*** -3.322*** -3.327*** -3.302*** -3.480***  1.093* 
(0.402) (0.465) (0.377) (0.358) (0.319) (0.333) (0.324) (0.334) (0.314) (0.412) (0.614) 
N  110 120 114  90  114 114 112 114 117 114  86 
Adjusted R
2  0.329 0.199 0.341 0.358 0.340 0.344 0.338 0.339 0.335 0.340 0.636 
Robust standard errors in brackets 




Table 8: Cross-country covariates associated with changes in deposit accounts penetration 
The results of OLS regressions of the changes in the natural logarithm of number of deposit accounts per 1,000 adults in commercial banks on 
different country characteristics.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 






0.024*** 0.002 -0.020* 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Population density (log)  -0.009 -0.012* -0.007 -0.004 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Expected real economic growth  0.043*  0.040**  0.046***  0.048*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 
(0.024) (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.017) (0.023) (0.024) 












(0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) 
Deposit insurance  0.029 
(0.022) 
East Asia & Pacific   -0.008 -0.007 
(0.040) (0.041) 
Europe & Central Asia  -0.020 -0.021 
(0.041) (0.041) 
High income   0.054 0.052 
(0.046) (0.046) 
Latin America & Caribbean   0.042 0.044 
(0.034) (0.035) 
Middle East & North Africa  -0.017 -0.016 
(0.040) (0.041) 
South Asia   -0.029 -0.030 
(0.042) (0.042) 
Offshore financial center  -0.018 
(0.025) 




*  0.295*** 0.277*** 0.272*** 
(0.063) (0.072) (0.072) (0.088) (0.082) (0.081) (0.069) (0.085) (0.089) (0.091) 
N  74 74 73 73 74 73 73 73 73 73 
Adjusted R
2  0.108 0.108 0.146 0.233 0.197 0.315 0.331 0.241 0.250 0.240 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
   (11)  (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Expected real economic growth  0.030*  0.036** 0.041** 0.041** 0.037** 0.039*** 0.040**  0.038**  0.061** 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) 
# commercial bank deposit accounts in 2008 (log)  -0.040*** -0.049***  -0.031  -0.041*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.041*** 
(0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
# commercial banks in 2008/2009  0.005 
(0.052) 
Branches per adults (log)  0.010 
(0.015) 
Interest spread  0.005 
(0.004) 
Concentration  0.015 
(0.058) 
Credit information index  0.004 
(0.006) 
Credit rank  -0.000 
(0.000) 
Credit legal rights  0.001 
(0.005) 
Registry coverage  0.000 
(0.000) 
Foreign bank share  0.040 
(0.048) 
Government bank share  -0.087* 
(0.046) 
Constant  0.277*** 0.428*  0.177  0.268**  0.296*** 0.324*** 0.281*** 0.298***  0.269** 
(0.104) (0.232) (0.155) (0.107) (0.084) (0.105) (0.085) (0.089) (0.103) 
N  65 71 48 72 73 73 73 73 49 
Adjusted R
2  0.191 0.242 0.156 0.220 0.232 0.233 0.227 0.231 0.265 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 9: Cross-country covariates associated with loan penetration 
The results of OLS regressions of the natural logarithm of number of outstanding loans per 1,000 adults in commercial banks on different country 
characteristics.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.951*** 0.954*** 0.778*** 0.904*** 0.959*** 0.785*** 0.572*** 0.428*** 0.880*** 0.940*** 0.980*** 
(0.084) (0.083) (0.106) (0.089) (0.090) (0.080) (0.156) (0.131) (0.083) (0.086) (0.100) 
Population density (log)  -0.029 
(0.055) 
Branches per adult (log)  0.388** 
(0.162) 
Branches per km
2 (log)  0.061 
(0.050) 
Expected real economic growth  0.150 
(0.377) 
Inflation  -0.049** 
(0.019) 
Electricity consumption  0.335 
(0.225) 
Land line and cell phone users  1.102*** 
(0.198) 
Absence of violence  0.091 
(0.133) 
Offshore financial center  0.309 
(0.221) 
Lending rate  0.016 
(0.012) 
Constant  -2.716*** -2.615***  2.255  -2.006**  -2.916***  -0.786  -1.903*  -3.191*** -2.080*** -2.649*** -3.137*** 
(0.714) (0.777) (2.137) (0.789) (0.934) (0.761) (1.000) (0.638) (0.692) (0.726) (0.885) 
N  68 68 67 65 68 63 56 51 66 68 53 
Adjusted R
2  0.760 0.757 0.792 0.737 0.757 0.779 0.673 0.858 0.734 0.759 0.722 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 9 (continued) 
    (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.879*** 0.947*** 0.776*** 0.827*** 0.874*** 0.821*** 0.776*** 0.899*** 0.926*** 0.852*** 0.787*** 0.884*** 0.865*** 
(0.075) (0.080) (0.095) (0.076) (0.082) (0.072) (0.090) (0.090) (0.082) (0.141) (0.127) (0.144) (0.136) 
Deposit insurance  0.545*** 
(0.171) 






Credit rank  -0.007*** 
(0.002) 






Foreign bank share  0.196 
(0.330) 
Registry coverage  0.004 
(0.003) 
Agents (credit)  -0.199 
(0.411) 








Fees - consumer loan  0.024 
(0.121) 




Constant  -2.450***  -3.062***  -1.848**  -1.220* -1.196*  -1.539** -1.172  -2.411***  -2.451***  -2.107*  -1.008  -2.089  -1.796 
(0.629) (0.764) (0.759) (0.651) (0.657) (0.637) (0.761) (0.732) (0.731) (1.123) (1.063) (1.316) (1.187) 
N  68 68 66 66 65 44 43 68 66 30 28 26 29 
Adjusted R
2  0.782 0.767 0.766 0.768 0.758 0.824 0.745 0.760 0.734 0.748 0.771 0.738 0.757 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 10: Cross-country covariates associated with lending volume 
The results of OLS regressions of the natural logarithm of value of loans in commercial banks over GDP on different country characteristics.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.385*** 0.283*** 0.281*** 0.386*** 0.347*** 0.412***  0.243  0.324*** 0.372*** 0.368*** 0.368*** 
(0.046) (0.051) (0.057) (0.046) (0.040) (0.065) (0.148) (0.078) (0.093) (0.045) (0.081) 
Population density (log)  0.091* 0.086* -0.152 0.091*  0.081 0.093** 0.090  0.176***  0.096*  0.055  0.072 
(0.048) (0.047) (0.099) (0.049) (0.050) (0.046) (0.059) (0.043) (0.055) (0.050) (0.056) 
Branches per adult (log)  0.261*** 
(0.080) 
Branches per km
2 (log)  0.239*** 
(0.070) 
Expected real economic growth  0.026 
(0.165) 
Inflation  -0.021*** 
(0.008) 
Electricity consumption  -0.194 
(0.196) 
Land line and cell phone users  0.167 
(0.130) 
Road density  0.093 
(0.137) 
Absence of violence  0.033 
(0.135) 
Offshore financial center  0.726*** 
(0.177) 
Lending rate  -0.030** 
(0.012) 
Constant  -4.653*** -1.397  -1.518 -4.688***  -4.062***  -4.770*** -4.687*** -4.884*** -4.563*** -4.391*** -4.054*** 
(0.393) (1.079) (1.036) (0.426) (0.394) (0.458) (0.521) (0.362) (0.722) (0.383) (0.747) 
N  120 113 109 119 112 118 101  83  115 120  84 
Adjusted R
2  0.393 0.455 0.438 0.386 0.431 0.393 0.313 0.546 0.372 0.415 0.384 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 10 (continued) 
 
    (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.387*** 0.335*** 0.315*** 0.379*** 0.390*** 0.412*** 0.372*** 0.363*** 1.023*** 0.226*** 0.922*** 
(0.050) (0.048) (0.046) (0.060) (0.058) (0.061) (0.059) (0.049) (0.082) (0.035) (0.099) 
Population density (log)  0.090*  0.138***  0.117**  0.093* 0.091 0.093*  0.093* 0.094* -0.069  0.170***  -0.010 
(0.052) (0.038) (0.047) (0.049) (0.056) (0.050) (0.048) (0.050) (0.068) (0.042) (0.071) 
Concentration  0.092 
(0.293) 
Government bank share  -0.328 
(0.330) 
Foreign bank share  -0.220 
(0.228) 
Contract enforcement procedures  -0.003 
(0.011) 
Contract enforcement time  0.000 
(0.000) 
Contract enforcement cost  0.004* 
(0.002) 
Registry coverage  0.001 
(0.002) 
Agents (credit)  0.277* 
(0.156) 
Credit legal rights  0.082** 
(0.036) 
Credit rank  0.001 
(0.001) 
Credit information index  0.143*** 
(0.050) 
Constant  -4.743*** -4.301*** -4.006*** -4.496*** -4.770*** -5.019*** -4.581*** -4.551*** -3.452*** -3.480*** -2.974*** 
(0.480) (0.511) (0.516) (0.829) (0.558) (0.561) (0.460) (0.427) (0.782) (0.412) (0.755) 
N  113  80  80  116 116 116 120 114  64  114  64 
Adjusted R
2  0.372 0.464 0.390 0.372 0.373 0.379 0.388 0.365 0.780 0.340 0.788 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 11: Cross-country covariates associated with changes in loan penetration 
The results of OLS regressions of the changes in the natural logarithm of number of loans per 1,000 adults in commercial banks on different 
country characteristics.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.008 0.011 
(0.015) (0.017) 
Population density (log)  0.007 0.001 
(0.023) (0.023) 
Expected real economic growth   0.053 0.060*  0.060** 
(0.043) (0.031) (0.030) 
Expected GDP (log)  0.026** 0.026**  0.035***  0.028** 0.043***  0.046***  0.049*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
# outstanding commercial bank loans in 2008 (log)  -0.033* -0.039**  -0.054**  -0.049***  -0.055*** 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) 
Deposit insurance  0.065 
(0.058) 
EAP  0.038 
(0.104) 
ECA  0.019 
(0.102) 
High income  0.022 
(0.128) 
LAC  0.084 
(0.108) 
MENA  0.155 0.121**  0.107** 
(0.095) (0.046) (0.045) 
South Asia  -0.216* -0.245***  -0.253*** 
(0.108) (0.085) (0.085) 
Offshore financial center  0.104 
(0.068) 
Constant  -0.065 -0.174 -0.155  -0.151***  0.039 0.058 0.087 0.086  0.098* 
(0.132) (0.165) (0.109) (0.049) (0.078) (0.077) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) 
N  58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Adjusted R
2 -0.0144  -0.0420  0.0335  0.0510  0.116 0.123 0.238 0.268 0.277 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 11 (continued) 
 
    (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Expected GDP (log)  0.038** 0.035***  0.036***  0.020  0.032** 0.039***  0.035*** 0.036**  0.027 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) 
# outstanding commercial bank loans in 2008 (log)  -0.035* -0.047*  -0.038** -0.029  -0.029* -0.023  -0.016 -0.033* -0.019 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.018) (0.033) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029) 
# commercial banks in 2008/2009  -0.059 
(0.082) 
Branches per adults (log)  0.026 
(0.025) 
Concentration  -0.096 
(0.130) 
Interest spread  0.006 
(0.004) 
Credit legal rights  -0.011 
(0.007) 
Credit information index  -0.013 
(0.013) 
Credit rank  0.001* 
(0.001) 
Registry coverage  -0.000 
(0.001) 
Foreign bank share  0.066 
(0.117) 
Government bank share  0.020 
(0.081) 
Constant  0.095 0.351 0.125 0.023 0.087 0.024 -0.114 0.038 -0.025 
(0.151) (0.299) (0.140) (0.176) (0.098) (0.082) (0.105) (0.088) (0.072) 
N  53 58 57 42 58 58 58 58 34 
Adjusted R
2 0.106  0.111  0.140  0.0499  0.124 0.114 0.150 0.100  -0.0419 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 12: Cross-country covariates associated with the demographic penetration of branches 
The results of OLS regressions of the natural logarithm of number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults on different country 
characteristics.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.526*** 0.533*** 0.516*** 0.516*** 0.402*** 0.344*** 0.484*** 0.531*** 0.523*** 0.504*** 0.480*** 0.493*** 0.519*** 
(0.027) (0.029) (0.034) (0.033) (0.098) (0.091) (0.052) (0.044) (0.027) (0.032) (0.044) (0.038) (0.041) 
Population density (log)  0.053 0.054 0.046 0.050 0.042 0.011 -0.039 0.053 0.048 0.012 0.047  0.108**  0.061 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.044) (0.040) (0.045) (0.042) (0.074) (0.042) (0.038) (0.055) (0.052) (0.049) (0.045) 
Expected real economic growth  0.166 
(0.220) 




Inflation  -0.004 
(0.006) 
Electricity consumption  0.087 
(0.116) 
Land line and cell phone users  0.436** 
(0.188) 
Road density  0.085 
(0.090) 
Absence of violence  -0.039 
(0.086) 
Offshore financial center  0.130 
(0.215) 
Concentration  -0.240 
(0.459) 
Government bank share  -0.304 
(0.377) 
Foreign bank share  0.095 
(0.211) 





























(0.316) (0.426) (0.318) (0.379) (0.421) (0.344) (0.496) (0.396) (0.306) (0.629) (0.536) (0.482) (0.474) 
N  121 120 110 116  96  88  81  111 121 109  75  75  109 
Adjusted R
2  0.645 0.645 0.636 0.638 0.518 0.650 0.659 0.608 0.643 0.572 0.606 0.609 0.593 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: Cross-country covariates associated with the geographic penetration of branches 
The results of OLS regressions of the natural logarithm of number of commercial bank branches per km
2 on different country characteristics. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.592*** 0.599*** 0.574*** 0.579*** 0.426*** 0.398*** 0.543*** 0.608*** 0.590*** 0.576*** 0.558*** 0.570*** 0.593*** 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040) (0.102) (0.092) (0.056) (0.046) (0.032) (0.034) (0.047) (0.040) (0.043) 
Population density (log)  1.069*** 1.072*** 1.060*** 1.067*** 1.060*** 1.024*** 0.953*** 1.067*** 1.066*** 1.021*** 1.058*** 1.124*** 1.077*** 
(0.043) (0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.047) (0.046) (0.076) (0.043) (0.041) (0.056) (0.053) (0.049) (0.046) 
Expected real economic growth  0.212 
(0.255) 




Inflation  -0.005 
(0.006) 
Electricity consumption  0.139 
(0.120) 
Land line and cell phone users  0.497** 
(0.194) 
Road density  0.116 
(0.094) 
Absence of violence  -0.046 
(0.088) 
Offshore financial center  0.093 
(0.220) 
Concentration  -0.347 
(0.457) 
Government bank share  -0.226 
(0.390) 
Foreign bank share  0.118 
(0.219) 





























(0.379) (0.501) (0.387) (0.463) (0.447) (0.410) (0.523) (0.418) (0.368) (0.643) (0.567) (0.500) (0.502) 
N  112 111 101 108  96  84  81  111 112 109  75  75  109 
Adjusted R
2  0.873 0.872 0.874 0.872 0.862 0.881 0.871 0.876 0.872 0.860 0.886 0.875 0.866 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14:  Cross-country covariates associated with changes in demographic penetration of branches 
The results of OLS regressions of the changes in natural logarithm of number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults on different 
country characteristics.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.018**  -0.018** -0.020*** -0.025**  -0.023** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) 
Population density (log)  -0.001 
(0.006) 
Expected real economic growth  -0.092 
(0.079) 
Branches per adult in 2008 (log)  0.014  0.008 -0.017*  -0.002 -0.015 -0.016 -0.018 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
% change in number of banks  0.336*  0.384** 0.353** 0.392** 0.411**  0.267 
(0.170) (0.163) (0.158) (0.166) (0.168) (0.194) 
East Asia & Pacific  -0.069* 
(0.036) 
Europe & Central Asia  -0.061 
(0.038) 
High income  -0.071** 
(0.031) 
Latin America & Caribbean  -0.056** 
(0.026) 
Middle East & North Africa  -0.041 
(0.025) 
South Asia  0.036 
(0.059) 
Offshore financial center  -0.074** 
(0.028) 
Concentration  -0.034 
(0.054) 
Foreign bank share  0.013 
(0.040) 
Government bank share  -0.034 
(0.062) 
Constant  0.190*** 0.201*** 0.289***  0.376*  0.294  -0.132 0.054 -0.107 -0.098 -0.140 
(0.069) (0.072) (0.093) (0.216) (0.207) (0.092) (0.120) (0.093) (0.084) (0.105) 
N  104  103  103  104  87 87 87 87 84 55 
Adjusted R
2  0.0535 0.0475 0.0924 0.0511  0.214  0.164 0.188 0.183 0.150  0.0477 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 41 
 
Table 15: Deposit penetration and financial inclusion agenda 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.643*** 0.653*** 0.681*** 0.660*** 0.673*** 0.675*** 0.692*** 0.664*** 0.619*** 
(0.061) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.061) 
FI index  -0.077* 
(0.044) 
FI index (effective)  -0.075 
(0.046) 
Resource gap  -0.031 
(0.058) 
FI deposits index  -0.091 
(0.059) 
FI deposits index (effective)  -0.075 
(0.060) 
Responsible for consumer protection  -0.430*** 
(0.154) 
Responsible for financial literacy  0.141 
(0.166) 
Responsible for promoting savings  -0.243 
(0.159) 




Constant  1.298**  1.140** 0.774 1.116**  0.925*  1.114** 0.574 0.998**  1.450** 
(0.584) (0.533) (0.496) (0.541) (0.518) (0.499) (0.522) (0.485) (0.560) 
N  100 100 100 100 100  96  96  96  96 
Adjusted R
2  0.640 0.637 0.627 0.635 0.631 0.654 0.636 0.641 0.651 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variable: # commercial bank deposits/1000 adults (log) 42 
 
Table 16: Access to deposit and loan services and financial inclusion agenda 
 
   (1)  (2) 
FI effective index  FI index 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.268** -0.251* 
(0.119) (0.143) 
Population density (log)  -0.049 -0.067 
(0.053) (0.069) 
Expected GDP (log)  0.124** 0.126** 
(0.054) (0.058) 
# deposit accounts/1,000 adults (log, lagged)  -0.008 -0.085 
(0.097) (0.127) 
# loans/1,000 adults (log, lagged)  0.195** 0.133 
(0.095) (0.136) 
Deposit insurance  -0.308* -0.358* 
(0.154) (0.181) 
Credit rank  0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Constant  1.370** 2.432*** 
(0.537) (0.652) 
σ  0.439*** 0.521*** 
(0.064) (0.077) 
Number of observations  61  61 
Log-likelihood -44.33  -51.07 
Pseudo R
2 0.116  0.120 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Results of Tobit estimation, dependent variable is between 0 and 1. 
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Table 17: Financial inclusion reforms 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.119*  -0.014 -0.018 -0.061 -0.005 -0.011 
(0.067) (0.059) (0.055) (0.058) (0.040) (0.040) 
Population density (log)  0.006 0.033  0.037**  0.021  0.036*  0.040** 
(0.031) (0.021) (0.018) (0.029) (0.018) (0.016) 
Expected GDP (log)  0.059* 0.008  0.006 
(0.031) (0.029) (0.027) 
# deposit accounts/1,000 adults (log, 
lagged) 
0.003 0.005 0.024 -0.012 0.003 0.022 -0.032 0.012 0.035 
(0.056) (0.046) (0.046) (0.058) (0.046) (0.046) (0.057) (0.050) (0.049) 
# loans/1,000 adults (log, lagged)  0.005 -0.068 -0.041 -0.016 -0.072 -0.044 -0.011 -0.035 -0.027 
(0.067) (0.056) (0.054) (0.069) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.038) (0.038) 
Deposit insurance  0.020  0.134 0.151* 0.114  0.147**  0.163** 
(0.105) (0.095) (0.088) (0.087) (0.072) (0.065) 
Credit rank  -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FI effective index  0.560*** 0.573*** 0.554***  0.548*** 
(0.119) (0.107) (0.106)  (0.083) 
FI index  0.559*** 0.569*** 0.554***  0.523*** 
(0.100) (0.092) (0.093)  (0.071) 
Constant  1.030*** 0.382  0.030 0.857*** 0.347  -0.003 0.552** 0.220  -0.020 0.092** 0.037 
(0.306) (0.307) (0.301) (0.302) (0.274) (0.257) (0.229) (0.215) (0.208) (0.039) (0.041) 
σ  0.294*** 0.242*** 0.227*** 0.305*** 0.243*** 0.228*** 0.322*** 0.261*** 0.246*** 0.287*** 0.277*** 
(0.034) (0.027) (0.024) (0.036) (0.028) (0.024) (0.038) (0.028) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) 
Number  of  observations  61 61 61 61 61 61 62 62 62  146  146 
Log-likelihood  -22.14 -11.55 -7.960 -24.19 -11.60 -7.996 -28.10 -16.88 -13.25 -52.05 -46.83 
Pseudo R
2  0.184 0.574 0.706 0.108 0.572 0.705  0.0271  0.415 0.541 0.300 0.370 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variable: Reform index. Results of Tobit estimation, dependent variable is between 0 and 1. 
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Table 18: Promoting savings 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GDP per capita (log) 
-0.152*  -0.143 -0.132 -0.119 
(0.082) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) 
Population density (log)  -0.037 
(0.035) 
Expected GDP (log)  0.097** 0.091** 0.090**  0.080*  0.066  0.036 
(0.042) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.027) 
# deposit accounts/1,000 adults (log, lagged)  
(commercial banks) 
-0.046 -0.068 -0.076 -0.080 -0.098  -0.131***  -0.099*** 
(0.070) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.067) (0.043) (0.038) 
# loans/1,000 adults (log, lagged)  
(commercial banks) 
0.069 0.078 0.063 0.046 -0.021 
(0.078) (0.079) (0.069) (0.066) (0.049) 
Deposit insurance  -0.111 -0.103 -0.096 
(0.114) (0.113) (0.109) 
Credit rank 
0.001 0.001 
(0.001)  (0.001)                
Number  of  observations  58 58 58 58 58 79 80 
Log-likelihood -25.74  -26.05  -26.23 -26.47 -27.38 -36.69 -39.43 
Pseudo R
2  0.166 0.156 0.150 0.142 0.113 0.108  0.0755 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variable: FI Savings (effective) - equals 1 if the financial regulator oversees promoting savings and has a dedicated team, equals 0 otherwise. Table reports marginal 
effects of probit estimation. 
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Table 19: Promoting access to finance in rural areas 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
GDP per capita (log) 
-0.363*** -0.357*** -0.351*** -0.279*** -0.254*** -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.201*** -0.251*** 
(0.119) (0.112) (0.114) (0.065) (0.040) (0.051) (0.053) (0.036) (0.045) 
Population density (log)  -0.081 -0.079 -0.082 -0.070 -0.050 -0.043 -0.065 -0.028 
(0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.043) (0.031) (0.029) (0.055) (0.031) 
Expected GDP (log)  0.147*** 0.147*** 0.140*** 0.101*** 0.092*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.033) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) 
# deposit accounts/1,000 adults (log, 
lagged) 
(commercial banks) 
0.098 0.091 0.090 0.061 
(0.082) (0.080) (0.080) (0.060) 
# loans/1,000 adults (log, lagged) 
(commercial banks) 
0.061 0.050 0.039 
(0.081) (0.071) (0.069) 
Deposit insurance  -0.068 -0.064 
(0.138) (0.140) 
Credit rank  0.001 
(0.001) 









# commercial banks  -0.000 
                     (0.000)    
Number of Observations  58  58  58  79  126  108  108  97  126 
Log-likelihood  -23.29 -23.38 -23.47 -31.92 -46.74 -38.90 -38.93 -35.41 -47.94 
Pseudo R
2  0.318 0.316 0.313 0.302 0.380 0.334 0.334 0.318 0.364 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variable: FI Rural (effective) - equals 1 if the financial regulator oversees promoting access to finance in rural areas and has a dedicated team, equals 0 otherwise. Table 
reports marginal effects of probit estimation. 
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Table 20: Consumer protection and financial literacy 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
GDP per capita (log) 
-0.190 -0.191 -0.185 -0.114 -0.126  -0.069 -0.069 -0.050 
(0.129) (0.130) (0.125) (0.114) (0.111)  (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) 
Population density (log)  -0.010 -0.009 
(0.053) (0.053) 
Expected GDP (log)  0.068 0.066 0.061  0.074 0.072 0.068 0.062 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.047)  (0.051) (0.050) (0.052) (0.048) 
# deposit accounts/1,000 adults (log, lagged)  -0.073 -0.079 -0.079 -0.088  -0.164 -0.169 -0.166 -0.171 -0.174 
(0.107) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102)  (0.116) (0.110) (0.107) (0.104) (0.107) 
# loans/1,000 adults (log, lagged)  0.277** 0.282** 0.272** 0.221** 0.180**  0.081*  0.315** 0.318** 0.269** 0.234**  0.255*** 
(0.128) (0.128) (0.118) (0.113) (0.088) (0.042) (0.129) (0.127) (0.121) (0.095) (0.099) 
Deposit insurance  -0.045  -0.041  -0.400** -0.397** -0.374** -0.367**  -0.283* 
(0.179) (0.176)  (0.177) (0.177) (0.187) (0.184) (0.161) 
Credit rank 
0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)           (0.002)  (0.002)          
Number  of  Observations  58 58 58 58 61 61 58 58 58 58 58 
Log-likelihood  -36.25 -36.26 -36.30 -37.99 -39.88 -40.51 -34.24 -34.26 -34.77 -34.84 -35.75 
Pseudo R
2  0.0953 0.0948 0.0940 0.0518 0.0553 0.0402  0.147 0.147 0.134 0.133 0.110 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variable: FI CP (effective) for columns (17) - (22) - equals 1 if the financial regulator oversees financial consumer protection and has a dedicated team, equals 0 
otherwise. FI FL (effective) for columns (23) - (27) equals 1 if the financial regulator oversees financial capability/education/literacy and has a dedicated team, equals 0 otherwise. 
Table reports marginal effects of probit estimation. 
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Table 21: Promoting access to finance for SMEs and regulation of microfinance 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.224** -0.209** -0.210**  -0.192*  -0.152* 
-
0.127***  -0.234* -0.224*  -0.208 -0.178**  -0.166* 
-
0.195*** 
(0.099) (0.096) (0.096) (0.100) (0.088) (0.028) (0.136) (0.133) (0.130) (0.084) (0.085) (0.034) 
Population density (log)  -0.016 -0.015  -0.039 -0.038 -0.039 -0.041 
(0.046) (0.045)  (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.049) 
Expected GDP (log)  0.075* 0.070 0.069* 0.052  0.060 0.059 0.038 0.060 0.054 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043)  (0.053) (0.054) (0.049) (0.044) (0.044) 
# deposit accounts/1,000 
adults (log, lagged) 
0.020  -0.075 -0.077 -0.072 -0.093 -0.108 
(0.088)  (0.107) (0.107) (0.109) (0.086) (0.082) 
# loans/1,000 adults 
(log, lagged) 
0.113 0.098 0.102 0.074 0.071  0.079 0.061 0.030 
(0.078) (0.078) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071)  (0.120) (0.111) (0.110) 
Deposit insurance  -0.136 -0.140 -0.142  -0.175 -0.168 
(0.117) (0.115) (0.112)  (0.172) (0.167) 
Credit rank  -0.000 -0.000  0.001 
(0.001)  (0.001)              (0.002)                
Number  of  Observations  58 61 61 61 61  127  58 58 58 79 79  127 
Log-likelihood  -28.56 -30.47 -30.54 -31.00 -32.19 -63.27 -32.42 -32.51 -32.97 -43.73 -44.04 -67.35 
Pseudo R
2 0.109  0.104  0.102  0.0888  0.0540  0.164  0.187 0.185 0.174 0.197 0.191 0.227 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variable: FI SME (effective) for columns (28) - (33) - equals 1 if the financial regulator oversees promotion of SME A2F and has a dedicated team, equals 0 otherwise. 
FI MF (effective) for columns (34) - (39) equals 1 if the financial regulator oversees regulation of microfinance and has a dedicated team, equals 0 otherwise. Table reports 
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Appendix 1: Variables 
Variable Description  Source 
Inflation   Maximum rate of inflation in the last five years  IFS 
Expected real 
economic growth 
An indicator variable for negative real GDP growth in 2008 and positive expected real GDP 
growth in 2009  WEO 
Capital account 
openness  The extent of openness in capital account transactions (Chinn-Ito financial openness measure)  Chinn and Ito (2008) 
Deposit insurance  An indicator variable for explicit deposit insurance in 2003  Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaovali and 
Laeven (2005) 
Electricity 
consumption  Kilowatts per hour consumption per capita in 2006  WDI 
Land line and cell 
phone users  Number of land line and cell phone users per 100 people in 2008  WDI 
Absence of violence  Sub-index of political stability / No violence, 2008  WB Governance Indicators 
Offshore financial 
center  An indicator variable for offshore financial centers. See source for definition.  Errico and Musalem 
Deposit rate  Deposit interest rate (%) in 2008  WDI 
GDP per capita  Gross domestic product per capita in current dollars in 2008  WDI 
Population density  Total population in 2008 divided by land area (in km
2) WDI 
Branches per adult  Number of branches in 2009 per 100,000 adults (15+)  Financial Access database 
Branches per km
2   Number of branches in 2009 divided by land area (in km2)  Financial Access database 
Concentration  Share of deposits in the five largest banks  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) 
Registry coverage  max of public registry coverage (% adults) and private registry coverage (% adults) in 2008  DB 
KYC requirements  An index aggregating the documentation required to open a checking account. See Kendall et al. 
(2010) for details.  Financial Access database 
KYC exceptions  An indicator variable for having exceptions in KYC requirements for low income individuals as 
of 2008  Financial Access database 
Low-fee accounts  An indicator variable for regulatory requirements for banks to offer a basic or low fee account to 
promote access to finance as of 2008  Financial Access database 
Tax incentives  An indicator variable for tax incentive schemes to promote financial access as of 2008  Financial Access database 
Agents (savings)  An index of agent operations allowed in terms of deposit accounts. See Kendall et al. (2010) for 
details.   Financial Access database 
Postal system (private 
operator) 
An indicator variable for financial services offered by post offices that are provided by private 
operators as of 2008  Financial Access database 
Credit legal rights  Index of creditor rights in 2009  DB 
Credit rank  Ranking of countries in terms of the ease of getting credit  DB 
Credit information 
index 
On a zero to six increasing scale measuring the access to, and scope & quality of credit 
information in 2009  DB 
Road density  Km of roads per 100 sq. km of land area, 5-year averages  WDI 51 
 
Appendix 1 (continued)  
Variable Description  Source 
Lending rate  Lending interest rate (%) in 2008  WDI 
Agents (credit)  An index of agent operations allowed in terms of loans. See Kendall et al. (2010) for details.   Financial Access database 
Places to submit loan 
application  Locations to submit loan applications (out of 5)  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Martinez Peria (2008) 
Minimum loan amount  Lowest amount of consumer loan banks make expressed as a percent of GDP per capita in 2004  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Martinez Peria (2008) 
Fees - consumer loan  Fee banks charge on consumer loans expressed as percent of GDP per capita in 2004  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Martinez Peria (2008) 
Days to process loan 
application  Number of days banks take to process a typical consumer loan application in 2004  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Martinez Peria (2008) 
Branch approval  Equals one if the Supervisor/Regulator approval is required to open each bank branch and zero 
otherwise in 2008  Financial Access database 
Interest spread  Lending rate minus deposit rate (%) in 2008  WDI 
Contract enforcement 
procedures  Number of procedures in enforcing a contract   DB 
Contract enforcement 
time  Length of time to enforce contracts (days) in 2008  DB 
Contract enforcement 
cost 
Total enforcement cost, including legal fees, assessment and court fees expressed as percentage 
of total debt in 2008  DB 
Documents required  The average number of documents (in the 5 largest banks) required to open a checking account in 
2008.  Banking the Poor (2008) 
Min. balance to open 
checking 
Minimum balance required to open a checking account expressed as a percent of GDP. It 
combines two databases. When data were available in both data sets, the variable takes the latest 
value. 
Banking the Poor (2008); Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez 
Peria (2008) 
Fees - checking 
account 
Fees associated with maintaining a checking account expressed as percent of GDP per capita in 
2004 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Martinez Peria (2008) 
Government bank 
share  Percentage of banking system assets in banks 50% + owned by government  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) 
Foreign bank share  Percentage of banking system assets in banks 50% + owned by foreign entities  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) 52 
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# commercial bank deposits in 
2009/1,000 Adults (log)  1       
# commercial bank loans in 
2009/1,000 Adults (log)  0.8461* 1      
commercial bank deposit volume in 
2009/GDP (log)  0.5295* 0.4820*  1     
commercial bank loan volume in 
2009/GDP (log)  0.7030* 0.6939* 0.8950*  1    
# commercial bank branches in 
2009/100,000 Adults (log)  0.7369* 0.7530* 0.4440* 0.6137*  1   
# commercial bank branches in 
2009/square km (log)  0.5955* 0.4870* 0.4264* 0.4816* 0.6468*  1 
Δ # commercial bank deposits/1000 
Adults (log)  -0.0729 -0.2166 -0.1092 -0.1862 -0.0349 0.0009 
Δ # commercial bank loans/1000 
Adults (log)  -0.0278 -0.0261 0.1481 -0.0212 -0.062  0.0097 
Δ commercial bank deposit 
volume/GDP (log)  0.0294 -0.0477 0.1089 0.0984  0.008  0.1315 
Δ commercial bank loan 
volume/GDP (log)  0.0816  0.0419 0.5493*  0.4963* 0.1258  0.1333 
Δ # commercial bank 
branches/100,000 Adults (log)  -0.1765 -0.2053 0.0382 -0.0088 0.0087 -0.0624 
Δ # commercial bank 
branches/square km (log)  -0.194 -0.2002 0.0462 -0.0023 -0.0058 -0.0745 
# commercial bank deposits in 
2008/1,000 Adults (log)  0.9847* 0.8661* 0.4637* 0.6623* 0.6923* 0.6004* 
# commercial bank loans in 
2008/1,000 Adults (log)  0.8407* 0.9936* 0.5105* 0.6794* 0.7851* 0.4956* 
commercial bank deposit volume in 
2008/GDP (log)  0.3583* 0.5376* 0.6512* 0.5486* 0.3479* 0.3220* 
commercial bank loan volume in 
2008/GDP (log)  0.4517* 0.6755* 0.3660* 0.5129* 0.4554* 0.3240* 
# commercial bank branches in 
2008/100,000 Adults (log)  0.7262* 0.7480* 0.3934* 0.5715* 0.9843* 0.6427* 
# commercial bank branches in 
2008/square km (log)  0.6094* 0.5091* 0.3972* 0.4610* 0.6339* 0.9955* 
GDP  per  capita  (log)  0.7960* 0.8739* 0.4211* 0.6216* 0.7880* 0.5131* 
Population density (log)  0.2479*  0.068  0.1940*  0.1315  0.047  0.7984* 
Expected  real  economic  growth  -0.1072 -0.2061 -0.0169 -0.0699 -0.0981  -0.013 
Inflation  -0.1035 -0.1694 0.0706 -0.0088  -0.3779*  -0.3006* 
Gini coefficient  -0.1326  0.2612  0.058  -0.0493  -0.168  -0.3777* 
Deposit  insurance  0.5657*  0.4827* 0.0708 0.1952*  0.4047*  0.2743* 
Electricity  consumption  0.6555* 0.7707* 0.3358* 0.5246* 0.6585* 0.3856* 
Land line and cell phone users  0.8062*  0.9072*  0.4600*  0.6193*  0.7724*  0.5103* 
Road  density  0.5337* 0.4726* 0.2508* 0.3706* 0.4501* 0.8088* 
Absence  of  violence  0.4825* 0.5389* 0.2227* 0.4133* 0.4863* 0.2656* 
Offshore financial center  0.1758  0.22  0.3464*  0.2928*  0.1427  0.2305* 
Credit information index  0.5263*  0.6486*  0.1504  0.3275*  0.5443*  0.3315* 
Concentration  -0.3391*  -0.3528*  -0.0532 -0.0993 -0.1707  -0.1952* 
Government bank share  -0.165  -0.2013  -0.15  -0.2418*  -0.2720*  -0.1468 
Foreign  bank  share  0.0551 -0.0047 -0.1906 -0.1397 -0.0585 -0.0694 
Contract enforcement procedures  -0.3208*  -0.3256*  -0.1788  -0.2694*  -0.3265*  -0.3006* 
Contract enforcement time  -0.1102  -0.1233  0.0651  -0.078  -0.1085  0.0223 
Contract enforcement cost  -0.3307*  -0.2538*  -0.1146  -0.1897*  -0.3620*  -0.2169* 
Registry  coverage  0.4931* 0.5954* 0.3249* 0.4241* 0.5391* 0.2776* 
KYC requirements  -0.1738  -0.159  -0.0535  -0.1985*  -0.2288*  -0.1664 
KYC exceptions  -0.1011  0  0.0721  -0.0167  -0.1229  -0.0314 53 
 











deposits  in 2009 
/ GDP 
Value of loans  











Low-fee  accounts 0.0891 0.0448 0.0684 0.1297  0.2242*  0.1128 
documents_~p -0.4726*  -0.4169*  -0.2488  -0.2892  -0.2728  -0.4013* 
deposit_mi~n  -0.4541*  -0.4192* -0.0914  -0.1334 -0.3377* -0.1876 
deposit_an~e  -0.5103* -0.4168*  -0.2548  -0.3168* -0.5768* -0.3889* 
Places to submit loan 
application  0.4542*  0.6272* 0.2551 0.4411*  0.5317* 0.2418 
Minimum loan amount  -0.4297*  -0.5719*  0.0044  -0.0969  -0.3393*  -0.1196 
Fees - consumer loan  0.0011  0.07  -0.1063  -0.1617  0.0486  -0.1332 
Days to process loan 
application  -0.2547 -0.2263  -0.221  -0.2364 -0.2544 -0.0826 
Lending rate  -0.3806*  -0.2648  -0.4211*  -0.4791*  -0.3973*  -0.3776* 
Branch approval  -0.2912*  -0.1121  -0.1186  -0.2785*  -0.2818*  -0.0999 
Tax  incentives  0.3372* 0.3871* 0.1899* 0.3212* 0.2038*  0.054 
Agents  (savings)  0.3126* 0.1832  0.1506 0.2047* 0.0727  0.0603 
Agents  (credit)  0.3041* 0.1986  0.1399 0.2180* 0.1288  0.0656 
Postal system (private 
operator)  0.4027* 0.2007 0.2157*  0.3023*  0.3262*  0.3164* 
Capital account 
openness  0.3785* 0.4541* 0.2809* 0.3787* 0.5462* 0.3814* 
Deposit rate  0.1024  -0.1224  -0.4114*  -0.4332*  -0.1179  -0.1591 
Credit legal rights  0.3693*  0.1356  0.1367  0.2390*  0.2989*  0.2909* 













Δ Loans per 




Δ Value of 
deposits /GDP 
(logs) 















Δ # commercial bank 
deposits/1,000 Adults (log)  1       
Δ # commercial bank loans/1,000 
Adults (log)  0.2922* 1      
Δ commercial bank deposit 
volume/GDP (log)  0.1552 0.0887  1     
Δ commercial bank loan 
volume/GDP (log)  0.102 0.0612  0.9733*  1    
Δ # commercial bank 
branches/100,000 Adults (log)  0.056 -0.088  -0.0312  0.0228  1   
Δ # commercial bank 
branches/square km (log)  0.0501 -0.037  -0.03  0.0136  0.9883*  1 
# commercial bank deposits in 
2009/1,000 Adults (log)  -0.0729 -0.0278 0.0294 0.0816 -0.1765 -0.194 
# commercial bank loans in 
2009/1,000 Adults (log)  -0.2166 -0.0261 -0.0477 0.0419 -0.2053 -0.2002 
commercial bank deposit volume in 
2009/GDP (log)  -0.1092 0.1481  0.1089 0.5493* 0.0382  0.0462 
commercial bank loan volume in 
2009/GDP (log)  -0.1862 -0.0212 0.0984 0.4963* -0.0088 -0.0023 
# commercial bank branches in 
2009/100,000 Adults (log)  -0.0349 -0.062  0.008  0.1258 0.0087 -0.0058 
# commercial bank branches in 
2009/square km (log)  0.0009 0.0097 0.1315 0.1333 -0.0624  -0.0745 
# commercial bank deposits in 
2008/1,000 Adults (log)  -0.2456* -0.1444  0.0135  0.0329  -0.213  -0.2401* 
# commercial bank loans in 
2008/1,000 Adults (log)  -0.1778 -0.1388 -0.0592 0.0314 -0.0774 -0.0674 
commercial bank deposit volume in 
2008/GDP (log)  -0.2592* 0.0722 -0.6835*  -0.6153* 0.0725  0.0825 
commercial bank loan volume in 
2008/GDP (log)  -0.2573* -0.0576 -0.6255*  -0.4907* 0.0329  0.0385 
# commercial bank branches in 
2008/100,000 Adults (log)  0.0015 -0.0417 0.0115 0.1172 -0.1679 -0.1801 
# commercial bank branches in 
2008/square km (log)  -0.0084 0.0136 0.1383  0.131  -0.1553 -0.1683 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.1051  0.0579  0.0453  0.1436  -0.1328  -0.1374 
Population density (log)  -0.0059  0.0572  0.1584  0.0781  -0.0674  -0.071 
Expected real economic growth  -0.2149  0.0538  0.0588  -0.0401  -0.095  -0.0868 
Inflation  -0.0234 0.0524 -0.1136 -0.1774 0.0434 0.0462 
Gini  coefficient  -0.0731 0.2739 0.1753 0.1029  0.3002*  0.3147* 
Deposit  insurance  0.1076  0.2011 -0.1277 -0.0939 -0.1866  -0.1945* 
Electricity  consumption  -0.1379 -0.2102 -0.0487 0.1461 -0.1686 -0.1902 
Land line and cell phone users  -0.0789  -0.1142  -0.0377  0.0149  -0.087  -0.0999 
Road density  -0.1006  -0.24  0.1649  0.1055  -0.2406*  -0.2497* 
Absence of violence  -0.1043  -0.111  0.068  0.0377  -0.1348  -0.132 
Offshore financial center  -0.0748 0.0636 0.0573 0.0582  0.2822*  0.3132* 
Credit information index  -0.1359  -0.0946  0.0276  0.0217  -0.0591  -0.0709 
Concentration  -0.0076 -0.2208 -0.0444 -0.0047 0.0369  0.032 
Government bank share  -0.113  0.2845  0.0195  -0.0548  0.0292  0.0283 
Foreign bank share  0.2151  -0.0523  -0.2742*  -0.1691  0.0581  0.0425 
Contract  enforcement  procedures  0.0396 0.0833 0.1065 0.1028 0.0536 0.0728 
Contract  enforcement  time  -0.1165 0.0879 0.0328 0.1262 0.1836 0.1588 
Contract  enforcement  cost  0.1823 0.0131 0.0458 0.0257 0.0545 0.0746 
Registry  coverage  -0.2101 0.0103 0.0641 0.1047 -0.0235  -0.0368 
KYC  requirements  0.1764 0.0834 0.0583 0.0556 0.1865 0.1832 
KYC  exceptions  0.019  0.0421 0.3401*  0.3250* 0.1179  0.1307 55 
 
Appendix 3 (continued)  
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Δ Value of 
deposits /GDP 
(logs) 
Δ Value of 
loans/ GDP 
(logs) 





Δ Branches per 




Low-fee accounts  -0.0216  -0.0436  0.2267*  0.1989  0.0557  0.0526 
documents_~p  0.0254 -0.1167  0.106  -0.0364 0.1745 0.1837 
deposit_mi~n 0.0155  -0.0482  0.0876  0.0951  0.2233  0.2365 
deposit_an~e  0.1168 0.1718 0.2826 0.2878  0.3715*  0.4051* 
Places to submit loan 
application 
-0.1578 0.0747 0.0165 0.1776 -0.2273  -0.2428 
Minimum  loan  amount  0.2346 0.1365 0.2041 0.1135  0.4530*  0.5011* 
Fees - consumer loan  0.6231*  0.1646  0.0937  0.0914  0.1335  0.1003 
Days to process loan 
application 
0.0683 -0.4355* -0.0385 -0.0605  0.2523  0.253 
Lending rate  0.1348  0.2348  0.0972  -0.0236  0.1061  0.0888 
Branch  approval  -0.0661 -0.0777 0.0962 -0.0083 0.0583 0.0738 
Tax incentives  -0.0996  -0.0679  0.1108  0.1483  -0.056  -0.0644 
Agents  (savings)  -0.0791 0.0518 -0.0677 0.0017  -0.035 -0.0428 
Agents  (credit)  -0.0646 0.0658 -0.0779 0.0056 -0.0019 -0.0014 
Postal system (private 
operator) 
0.0599 -0.0801 -0.0462 0.0169 -0.0325 -0.0476 
Capital account 
openness 
0.0183 0.0912 -0.0999 0.1042  0.039  0.0359 
Deposit rate  0.052  0.1461  -0.2516*  -0.212  -0.0007  -0.0247 
Credit legal rights  -0.0452  -0.2385  0.0595  0.0285  -0.057  -0.0453 
Credit rank  0.1237  0.2646*  -0.0714  -0.0395  0.0734  0.0751 
 